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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I argue that intangible capital is not a distinct input to production like physical capital
or labor but rather it is the glue that creates value from other inputs. This perspective naturally leads
to an empirical model in which intangible capital is defined in terms of adjustment costs. Estimates
of these adjustment costs using firm-level panel data suggest that there are no appreciable
intangibles associated with R&D and advertising whereas information technology creates intangibles
with a 70% annual rate of return — a sizable figure that is nevertheless much smaller than reported
in previous studies. As a bridge to previous research, I show that much larger estimates can be
obtained by using ordinary least squares, which ignores the possibility that the value of the .rm and
its investment policy are simultaneously determined. Larger estimates can also be obtained by
ignoring the possibility that the stock market overstates the value of intangible-intensive companies.
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Almost without exception, there are no direct measures of the returns to intangible
capital. As a result, researchers have relied primarily on the equity market to infer the
value of intangibles. The basic idea is straightforward. If the equity market reveals the
intrinsic value of the ﬁrm, then subtracting the value of the ﬁrm’s tangible assets from
its market value reveals the value of the ﬁrm’s intangible assets. Using this method,
Hall (2001) argued that U.S. companies accumulated an enormous stock of intangible
capital in the 1990s.1
Despite the appealing simplicity of the equity market measurement approach, con-
siderable caution is warranted. According to this approach, Yahoo!’s intangibles were
worth upwards of $100 billion in 2000. However, they are now worth less than a tenth
of that number. To be sure, this drop does not necessarily pose a problem for the equity
market measurement approach. Yahoo!’s market capitalization could reﬂect changes
in expected proﬁts or expected returns or both. But this example illustrates a potential
pitfall from relying on the equity market to reveal the value of intangible capital. The
value of intangible capital will be mismeasured to the extent that asset prices depart
from their intrinsic value.
The basic drawback of the equity market measurement approach is that it presents
a catch-22: investors must have information about intangibles to value them; but in-
vestors do not have the information they need because intangibles, by their very nature,
are extraordinarily diﬃcult to value. This circularity calls into question the assump-
tion of strongly eﬃcient markets underlying the equity market measurement approach.
1The idea that the stock market reveals the quantity of capital in the absence of rents and adjustment
costs was stated clearly by Baily (1981), who interpreted the stock-market data in the 1970s as showing
that energy price shocks eﬀectively destroyed a great deal of capital.
1How can the value of the ﬁrm as revealed by equity markets be equal to the intrinsic
value of the ﬁrm — deﬁned as the present value of expected cash ﬂows — when so little
is known by market participants about the value of intangibles?
As an alternative proxy for the intrinsic value of the ﬁrm, I construct the discounted
value of expected proﬁts using analysts’ forecasts. I/B/E/S has collected data on proﬁt
forecasts for a large sample of companies since 1982. The analysts provide forecasts
of one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead proﬁts as well as the growth rate of proﬁts out
to a ﬁve-year horizon. In formulating their forecasts, analysts assess whether a new
supply chain management system, say, is expected to add to intangible capital and,
as a result, generate additional proﬁts. Thus, if intangibles are expected to contribute
materially to a company’s bottom line over the analysts’ ﬁve year horizon, then their
value should be reﬂected in analysts’ forecasts.
Of course, analysts’ forecasts are not a silver bullet. After all, the majority of ana-
lysts appear to have overestimated the growth rates of intangible-intensive companies
in the late-1990s. And, there’s little guidance about how to discount these forecasts.
Just as the stock market may be a poor proxy for a ﬁrm’s intrinsic value, so too may
be the discounted value of expected proﬁts. However, these two proxies deviate from
a ﬁrm’s intrinsic value for diﬀerent reasons. The stock-market-based measure reﬂects
any market ineﬃciency, whereas the analyst-based measure reﬂects any bias on the
part of analysts’ and mistakes in how the forecasts are discounted.
The econometric setup explicitly recognizes the fact that the two proxies measure
the ﬁrm’s intrinsic value with diﬀerent kinds of error. Ultimately, identiﬁcation of the
model parameters depends on whether there are informative instrumental variables
that are uncorrelated with the measurement errors inherent in the two proxies. Theory
2oﬀers little guidance about the nature of the measurement errors and, consequently,
identiﬁcation is an empirical issue that must be investigated with diagnostic tests, such
as the test of the model’s overidentifying restrictions.
For my empirical work, I put together a dataset that distinguishes ﬁrms’ expendi-
tures on tangible capital, information technology (IT), and intellectual property (IP).
Using these data, I estimate the return on each type of capital using both the stock-
market- and analyst-based measures of the ﬁrm’s intrinsic value. Perhaps the most
interesting ﬁnding is that organizational capital created by IT generates a return of
70% at an annual rate. Despite the magnitude of this estimate, it is considerably smaller
than comparable estimates in previous studies. As a bridge to the previous research,
I show that much larger estimates can be obtained by using ordinary least squares,
which ignores the possibility that the value of the ﬁrm and its investment policy are
simultaneously determined. Larger estimates can also be obtained by using a stock-
market-based measure of the ﬁrm’s intrinsic value.
2 The Valuation of Intangible Capital
2.1 Intangible Capital: An Instrumental Deﬁnition
I distinguish between two types of intangibles, intellectual property and organizational
capital. Broadly deﬁned, IP includes patents, trademarks, copyrights, brand names, se-
cret formulas and so on. For my purposes, I deﬁne organizational capital as business
models, designs, and routines that create value from information technology. With-
out a doubt, organizational capital is a broader concept than suggested by this very
3narrow deﬁnition. For example, innovative compensation policies and eﬀective train-
ing programs are surely part of organizational capital. Indeed, the systematic focus
on creating organizational capital can be traced to industrial pioneer Fredrick Winslow
Taylor and his intellectual forbearers. I adopt a deﬁnition based on IT not because IT
is qualitatively diﬀerent from any other method or technology that aids organizational
eﬃciency, but because sizable, measurable outlays are devoted to it.
This dichotomous taxonomy suits my empirical model and the data. In terms of the
data, companies report expenditures on R&D and advertising, which create what I have
deﬁned as intellectual property. These expenditures can be capitalized to create the
IP capital stock. It may seem like such a stock is essentially arbitrary — there is little
guidance, for example, about how R&D and advertising depreciate — but it should be
recognized that the stock of property, plant, and equipment is a similarly unpalatable
concept, even though researchers have become suﬃciently inured of it.2
As a practical matter, it is also important to distinguish between intellectual prop-
erty and organizational capital because outlays on R&D, advertising, and IT have be-
haved diﬀerently over time. In particular, R&D and advertising appear to be declining
in relative importance. Outlays on IT have soared while advertising as a proportion of
nonﬁnancial corporate gross domestic proﬁt grew modestly from 3.9% in 1980-89 to
4.1% in 1990-97; The comparable ﬁgures for R&D are 2.3% and 2.9% (Nakamura 1999).
Hence, if intangibles create extraordinary gains in ﬁrm value, arguably the most plau-
sible driver is organizational capital, not intellectual property.
2Indeed, the accounting for physical assets in ﬁnancial statements may be about as deﬁcient as the
accounting for IP. Physical assets are capitalized at historical costs and are depreciated in ways that may
be poor approximations to their service ﬂow. Perpetual inventory capital stocks constructed from such
data may also be only loose approximations to the service ﬂow of capital.
4So what exactly is organizational capital? As a purely mechanical matter, I deﬁne
organizational capital as an adjustment cost from IT investment, deﬁned as the diﬀer-
ence between the value of installed and uninstalled IT.3 Suppose a company purchases
database software. By itself, database software does not generate any value. At a min-
imum, the software has to be combined with a database and, perhaps, a sales force.
Organizational capital deﬁnes how the database is used and, consequently, how soft-
ware investment creates value.
A speciﬁc example helps illustrate the deﬁnition. Dell’s value depends on a unique
organizational design that sells build-to-order computers direct to customers. There’s
little diﬀerence between Dell’s and HP’s tangible capital stock since both companies
assemble computers. The reason any given piece of tangible capital is more valuable
when it is installed at Dell has to do with Dell’s unique business model and routines,
organizational capital that combines the usual factors of production in a special way.
HP cannot simply replicate Dell’s tangible capital stock and become as proﬁtable as
Dell. Hence, it doesn’t make sense to think about organizational capital, or intangibles
more generally, as separate factors of production that can be purchased in a market.
In most cases, intangibles are so closely connected with traditional factor inputs — like
a computer or a college graduate — that their valuation on a standalone basis is nearly
impossible (see, e.g., Lev 2001).
This deﬁnition contrasts sharply with the tendency in the literature to think about
intangible capital as pretty much like any other quasi-ﬁxed factor of production. In
that mold, ﬁrms buy intangibles like they buy machinery. But intangibles, by and large,
are diﬀerent from other factors because companies cannot order or hire intangibles.
3This rather narrow deﬁnition based on IT adjustment costs is motivated by a broader interpretation of
organizational capital in terms of adjustment costs, as in, for example, Prescott and Visscher (1980).
5That’s because intangible capital usually has to do with the distinctive way companies
combine the usual factors of production. Treating intangibles as an input itself misses
this point all together.
The model in the next section formalizes this observation by deﬁning intangibles
as whatever makes installed inputs more valuable than uninstalled inputs — that is,
whatever makes a Dell out of the same computers and college graduates that HP can
buy. Realistically, this deﬁnition isn’t exhaustive since there are intangibles that aren’t
associated with speciﬁc expenditures. For example, a good idea — selling computers
using the Internet in Dell’s case — can be thought of as a type of intangible capital.
Nevertheless, most intangibles are closely associated with some sort of outlay; after
all, it usually takes at least some investment to make a good idea proﬁtable.
My deﬁnition of organizational capital might seem similar to the more familiar con-
cept of multifactor productivity or IT-biased technical change. Indeed, organizational
capital is like IT-biased technical change in that both boost the marginal product of
IT capital. However, there is a critical diﬀerence: organizational capital is costly to
create; by contrast, MFP and IT-biased technical change require no speciﬁc outlays,
which is why they are called ‘manna from heaven.’ Organizational capital should be
distinguished from embodied technical change as well. Embodied technical change
characterizes the capabilities of a particular asset — disk drives are more eﬃcient and
reliable than they used to be — but organizational capital depends on how the ﬁrm
utilizes an asset. Returning to the example above, both Dell and HP can buy the same
technology embodied in a new disk drive but the drive is more valuable at Dell because
of its superior organizational capital.
62.2 Theoretical Model
The model is a straightforward variant of Hayashi and Inoue (1991), who derived an
expression for the value of a ﬁrm with multiple capital goods, and follows the deriva-
tion in Bond and Cummins (2000). Similar to what I have in mind, Hall (1993a) used
Hayashi and Inoue’s model to estimate the rate of return to R&D. The novel twist in our
application is the idea that intangibles are like adjustment costs, which can, in turn, be
estimated econometrically.
In each period, the ﬁrm chooses investment in each type of capital good: It =
(I1t,...,I Nt), where j indexes the N diﬀerent types of capital goods and t indexes
time.4 This is equivalent to choosing a sequence of capital stocks Kt = (K1t,...,K Nt),
given Kt−1, to maximize Vt, the cum-dividend value of the ﬁrm, deﬁned as:
Vt = Et






where Et is the expectations operator conditional on the set of information available
at the beginning of period t; βt
s discounts net revenue in period s back to time t; Π
is the revenue function net of factor payments, which includes the productivity shock
 s as an argument. Π is linear homogeneous in (Ks,I s) and the capital goods are the
only quasi-ﬁxed factors — or, equivalently, variable factors have been maximized out
of Π. For convenience in presenting the model, I assume that there are no taxes and
the ﬁrm issues no debt and has no current assets, although these considerations are
incorporated in the empirical work.
4The ﬁrm index i is suppressed to economize on notation except when it clariﬁes the variables that vary
by ﬁrm.
7The ﬁrm maximizes equation (1) subject to the series of constraints:
Kj,t+s = (1 − δj)Kj,t+s−1 + Ij,t+s s ≥ 0 (2)
where δj is the rate of physical depreciation for capital good j. In this formula-
tion, investment is subject to adjustment costs but becomes productive immediately.
Furthermore, current proﬁts are assumed to be known, so that both prices and the
productivity shock in period t are known to the ﬁrm when choosing Ijt. Other formu-
lations — such as one where there is a production and/or a decision lag — are possible
but this is a more parsimonious speciﬁcation.
Let the multipliers associated with the constraints in equation (2) be λj,t+s. Then































Combining equations (3) and (4) and using the linear homogeneity of Π(Kt,It,  t),
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8Hence, the value of the ﬁrm can be expressed as the sum of the installed values of
the beginning-of-period capital stocks, which according to equation (2) are equal to the
diﬀerence between the current capital stock and current investment. Since there are
three types of capital in the empirical work, the speciﬁc equation considered is
Vt = λK(Kt − It) + λKIT(KITt − ITt) + λKIP(KIPt − IPt) +  t (5)
where investment in tangible capital (excluding IT), information technology, and intel-
lectual property are I, IT, and IP; the capital stock (excluding IT) is denoted by K, and
the IT and IP capital stocks are distinguish by appending IT and IP.
Accordingtoequation(3), themultipliersoneachcapitalstockarethegrossmarginal
cost of an additional unit of capital, which is equal to the price of capital including ad-
justment costs. To be more concrete, posit an adjustment cost function, C, that is
additively separable from the net revenue function:




In this equation, it is possible to distinguish between the purchase price of capital and
marginal adjustment costs, which are additional outlays that are needed to make in-
vestment productive. This separation is attractive because adjustment costs — such
as training workers to use new equipment and integrating new and old equipment
— create intangible capital.5 Moreover, when it comes to empirical research, there’s
a well-developed literature on estimating adjustment costs econometrically, whereas
5For example, Hempell (2003) ﬁnds broad evidence that ﬁrms complement IT spending with training
programs for their employees (see also Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002). According to Hempell’s
empirical results, ﬁrms that invest intensively in both training and IT perform signiﬁcantly better than
competitors that do not.
9there is no practical way to directly measure the value of intangible capital using avail-
able data. In fact, the estimated marginal adjustment costs are equal to the return on
intangible capital in equilibrium. To see this, note that ﬁrms will invest until the gross
marginal cost of an additional unit of capital in equation (6) is equal to the marginal
product of capital, deﬁned by the Euler equation (4). Therefore, the equilibrium return
on intangible capital can be equated with adjustment costs.
Let’s return to the Dell-HP example to ﬁx ideas. A quick and dirty way to characterize
the diﬀerence between Dell and HP would be to say that the level of MFP is higher at
Dell. But this isn’t very informative because it wouldn’t explain why Dell produces more
with less. By contrast, the valuation equation (5) shows that it’s possible to trace the
sources of Dell’s superior valuation to its intangible capital, speciﬁcally the intangible
capital associated with its previous investments in IT and IP. New software, say, is
more valuable at Dell because of the way its used. While this type of ﬁnding is more
informative than attributing any and all diﬀerences to MFP, admittedly it still leaves
something to be desired. In particular, this approach fails to explain how software
became more valuable at Dell; estimating (5) doesn’t provide a blueprint for creating
value. To gain further insight on this point considerably better data and detailed case
studies are necessary.
Interpretation of the estimates of equation (5) is more complicated than it might
seem at ﬁrst glance. Notice that the multipliers are assumed constant. However, the
value of intangible capital could diﬀer over time and across ﬁrms; indeed, the compari-
son of Dell and HP suggests that this is a realistic possibility. Regrettably, the empirical
framework is not rich enough to accommodate this consideration. In practice, the prob-
lem is not as bad as it might seem, since I control for ﬁrm- and time-speciﬁc eﬀects.
10Nevertheless, to the extent that the multipliers are not constant after controlling for
these eﬀects, the empirical estimates of the multipliers will be averages across ﬁrms
and time.6 Hence, extreme caution must be exercised in interpreting the estimates as
structural parameters; rather, the estimates are revealing about the average return of
intellectual property and organizational capital. Lastly, it should be recognized that
this limitation is not unique to my setup. On the contrary, my setup is closely related
to production or cost function estimation, where it is also assumed that the param-
eters are constant across ﬁrms and time, in spite of the debatable case for such an
assumption.
3 Estimation of the Empirical Valuation Equation
Estimation of the empirical valuation equation (5) would be straightforward if there
were data on the intrinsic value of the ﬁrm and the error term was an innovation.
As I will discuss in turn, each of these conditions is unlikely to hold. As a result,
ordinary least squares estimates will be biased. Identiﬁcation is still possible in certain
circumstances using generalized method of moments. However, the GMM approach
does have some notable drawbacks which I discuss in the ﬁnal subsection.
Two primary issues must be confronted when it comes to estimating equation (5):
• The intrinsic value of the ﬁrm is unobservable.
What I have called the equity market approach explicitly assumes that the stock
marketvalueoftheﬁrm, VE, equalstheintrinsicvalueoftheﬁrm, V. Alternatively,
6Cross-sectional estimation wouldn’t sidestep this problem entirely because the estimates would still
be averages across ﬁrms. Moreover, cross-sectional estimation is inadvisable since there are no controls
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects.
11one could argue that any market mismeasurement is orthogonal to the ﬁrms’
current capital stocks and investments. Since either condition is at least suspect,
I propose an alternative that arguably rests on ﬁrmer footing.
• The productivity shock   — think of a new product or process — is unobservable
to the econometrician and it aﬀects both the value of the ﬁrm and its investment
policy.
As a result, OLS estimates will be biased. Alternatively, I use the system-GMM
estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000). They show that the
system-GMM estimator performs well when there are ﬁxed eﬀects and the en-
dogenous variables have near unit roots, as is true of all three types of capital.
3.1 Unobservable Value of the Firm
The most widely-used proxy for the intrinsic value of the ﬁrm is its stock market
value. According to one view of the stock market, this makes good sense since share
prices reﬂect the discounted value of expected future distributions from the ﬁrm to
its shareholders. If this is the case, there are two possible explanations for share
price movements: changes in expected future proﬁtability that support future divi-
dend payments, or changes in investors’ required rates of returns. Hence, share prices
of intangible-intensive companies may have been rising until 2000 on advance news
of unprecedented proﬁt growth. Another possibility consistent with this view is that
investors decided that the stock market was much less risky than they previously be-
lieved. For example, Siegel (1999) argues that the safest long-term investment vehicle
has been stocks, not bonds. Accordingly, investors may have realized that they were
irrationally fearful of stocks. In an environment in which stocks are not really all that
12risky, rational investors will bid up stock prices. In other words, the equity premium
was too high in the past but it’s just right now.7
Another view of the stock market cautions that share prices may sometimes have
a life of their own, away from the intrinsic level represented by the discounted value
of future distributions. The theoretical possibility that share prices deviate from their
intrinsic value because of a rational bubble has long been recognized.8 Outside of
this particular paradigm, there is an abundance of models in which share prices are
inﬂuenced by noise traders, fads or other psychological factors. While I cannot explain
the disconnect between asset prices and their intrinsic values, simple observation of the
behavior of — to name just two examples in addition to the ones already discussed —
tulip prices in 1634-37 and Japanese share prices in 1989, suggests that such behavior
is diﬃcult to dismiss on empirical grounds. In which case, the recent stock market
boom and at least partial bust may be another example of such anomalies. Indeed,
Shiller (2000) argues that investors have not rationally learned that the stock market is
less risky than they previously thought. Rather, he details a whole host of reasons why
investors have been, and continue to be, irrationally exuberant.
It is important to highlight the key distinction between these two diﬀerent views of
the stock market. In the ﬁrst, market eﬃciency is treated as a maintained hypothesis.
In the second, market ineﬃciency is treated as a maintained hypothesis. To illustrate
the implications of this, pick a stream of expected proﬁts. The ﬁrst theory tells us what
7McGrattan and Prescott (2000) use this argument to conclude that “it is troubling that economic theory
failed so miserably to account for historical asset values and returns while, at the same time, it does so well
in accounting for current observations.” The “current observations” in their study date from the beginning
of 2000, so apparently economic theory needs some work to explain the subsequent downturn (see also
Kiley 2000).
8A rational bubble occurs when the expected discounted future price does not converge to zero in the
limit. There are both theoretical and empirical arguments that can be used to rule out rational bubbles
(see, e.g., Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, chapter 7). Hence, rational bubbles are unlikely to oﬀer a
persuasive explanation for ﬁnancial market behavior.
13the (possibly time-varying) discount rate (i.e., the return) must be in order to justify the
observed stock price. The second theory tells us that there is some reason outside the
basic model — bubbles, noise traders, fads, or the like — why the stock price diﬀers
from its intrinsic value. It’s very diﬃcult to determine which of these explanations is
preferable because they both rely on unobservable factors to explain the very same
data. To have any degree of conﬁdence in either explanation, one must exploit the
testable implications of the dynamic stochastic structure of the unobservable factors.
To do so I set out a model based on joint research with Stephen Bond (2000, 2002).
Suppose the stock market reveals the intrinsic value of the ﬁrm with some error, so
that
VE
t = Vt + µt, (7)
where µt is the measurement error in the equity valuation VE
t , regarded as a measure
of the intrinsic value Vt. Substituting VE
t for Vt in equation (5) then gives the empirical
valuation equation when there are noisy share prices:
VE
t = λK(Kt − It) + λKIT(KITt − ITt) + λKIP(KIPt − IPt) + (µt +  t). (8)
Let’s consider the eﬀect of measurement error in the model’s dependent variable, and
ignore the diﬃculty presented by the unobservable productivity shock which is consid-
ered in the following section. The conventional wisdom is that measurement error of
this type biases the standard errors but not the coeﬃcient estimates (see, e.g., Haus-
man 1991). However, this is untrue when the measurement error is correlated with the
explanatory variables.
14To illustrate the argument, consider a simpliﬁed version of equation (8) in which the
ﬁrm has only IT capital. The coeﬃcient estimate on IT capital, call it bKIT, will consist
of the true return on IT, βKIT, and the bias caused by measurement error:
p limbKIT = βKIT + βµ,KIT,
where βµ,KIT is the coeﬃcient estimate from a hypothetical regression of the measure-
ment error on IT capital: βµ,KIT = COV(µ,KIT)/VAR(KIT). Clearly, there’s no bias if
COV(µ,KIT) = 0; the measurement error is uncorrelated with the regressor and the
conventional wisdom about measurement error in the dependent variable is correct.
However, if the stock market overestimates the value of IT-intensive companies, then
βµ,KIT > 0 and, therefore, the return to IT investment will be upward biased. Since
my sample is skewed toward the kind of companies commonly thought the have been
overvalued compared to fundamentals — companies in the 1990s with big IT budgets
— it seems reasonable to suspect that this upward bias could be substantial. However,
if the stock market were to underestimate the value of IT-intensive companies, the bias
would go in the other direction. Indeed, this type of downward bias would imply that
the true return to investment exceeded the estimated return during periods like the
1970s when the stock market was arguably undervalued compared to fundamentals.
Although it is not possible to sign the bias based on a priori reasoning in the multivari-
ate case, the estimated returns to IP and tangible capital are also likely to be biased.
However, the IT and IP coeﬃcients seem likely to be severely aﬀected because the stock
market appears to have overestimated the value of intangible-intensive companies in
the 1990s.
15As an alternative to using the stock market to infer the value of intangibles, I rely on
analysts’ proﬁt forecasts. Intangible assets create value only to the extent that they are
expected to generate proﬁts in the future. Professional analysts are paid to forecast the
future proﬁts of the ﬁrms they track — and leading analysts are paid very well indeed
for performing this role. Thus it is possible to ask whether analysts are forecasting
proﬁt growth in line with the intangible asset growth that seems to be implied by stock
market valuations. Though the popular press regularly lambastes analysts for being
far too optimistic, the answer is ‘no’.9 After introducing the data in the next section, I
show that analysts’ forecasts of future proﬁts are informative.
Combining these forecasts with a simple assumption about the discount rates βt
t+s,I
construct an alternative estimate of the present value of current and future net revenues
as
  Vt = Et
 
Πt + βt




I then use this estimate in place of the ﬁrm’s stock market valuation. Clearly the esti-
mate   Vt will also measure the ﬁrm’s intrinsic value, Vt, with some error ν. The potential
sources of measurement error include truncating the series after a ﬁnite number of fu-
ture periods, using an incorrect discount rate, and the fact that analysts forecast net
proﬁts rather than net revenues. The resulting empirical valuation equation is:
  Vt = λK(Kt − It) + λKIT(KITt − ITt) + λKIP(KIPt − IPt) + (νt +  t). (10)
9Armed with a time-varying, ﬁrm-speciﬁc discount rate, one can equate any stream of proﬁt forecasts to
the observed stock price at every observation; without additional restrictions there are, in fact, an inﬁnite
number of paths of time-varying discount rates that can equate the two. The key point is that extreme
assumptions would be required to obtain the VE’s in the sample from the analysts’ forecasts of future
proﬁts. Share prices in my sample appear to be high not only in relation to current proﬁts, but also in
relation to the best available forecasts of likely future proﬁts.
16As discussed in the following section, identiﬁcation will depend on whether the mea-
surement error ν is uncorrelated with suitably lagged values of instruments, for ex-
ample, capital stocks. This seems plausible since the current measurement error from
using analysts’ forecasts is unlikely to be correlated with lags of the capital stock. Ul-
timately, however, this is an empirical question that will be investigated using tests of
overidentifying restrictions.
3.2 Unobservable Productivity Shock
Despite some important diﬀerences, the empirical valuation equations (8) and (10) re-
semble a production function. This similarity is unfortunate because, as Griliches and
Mairesse (1999) say, “In empirical practice, the application of panel methods to micro-
data have produced rather unsatisfactory results.” Mairesse and Hall (1996) show
that attempts to control for unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity — both likely
sources of bias in the OLS results — have produced implausible estimates of production
function parameters. To be more speciﬁc, in my setup I assume that the unobservable
productivity shock consists of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc, a time-speciﬁc, and an idiosyncratic com-
ponent. In this case, the application of GMM estimators, which take ﬁrst diﬀerences to
eliminate unobservable ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects and use lagged instruments to correct for
simultaneity in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equations, has produced especially unsatisfactory
results.
Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) show that these problems are related to the weak
correlation between the regressors and the lagged levels of the instruments. This re-
sults in weak instruments in the context of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator. Bond
and Blundell show that these biases can be dramatically reduced by incorporating more
17informative moment conditions that are valid under quite reasonable conditions. Es-
sentially, their approach is to use lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences as instruments for equations
in levels, in addition to the usual lagged levels as instruments for equations in ﬁrst-
diﬀerences. The result is the so-called system-GMM estimator, which I use as the
preferred estimator. This is implemented using DPD98 for GAUSS (Arellano and Bond
1998).10
There are two types of diagnostic tests for the empirical models. First, I report the
p-value of the test proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to detect ﬁrst- and second-
order serial correlation in the residuals. The statistics, which have a standard normal
distribution under the null, test for nonzero elements on the second oﬀ-diagonal of the
estimated serial covariance matrix. Second, I report the p-value of the Sargan statistic
(also know as Hansen’s J-statistic), which is a test of the model’s overidentifying re-
strictions; formally, it is a test of the joint null hypothesis that the model is correctly
speciﬁed and that the instruments are valid.
3.3 Limitations of the Empirical Approach
If the GMM-based empirical approach were successfully implemented, then that would
be the end of the story in most applications. However, intangible assets pose a special
problem. According to my model, intangibles are associated with speciﬁc investments
but clearly that’s not the whole story; sometimes intangibles are not associated with
any identiﬁable outlay. In that case, at least some of the intangibles end up in the error
term as an omitted variable or as part of the unobservable productivity shock.
10In all speciﬁcations, time eﬀects are captured by including year dummies in the estimated
speciﬁcations.
18To ﬁx ideas, suppose the ﬁxed eﬀect in the unobservable productivity shock repre-
sents intangible capital. If the ﬁxed eﬀect embeds intangible capital in this way, the
econometric cure may be worse than the disease. In particular, ﬁrst-diﬀerencing would
sweep out the eﬀect of ﬁxed intangible capital. As a result, the possibility that in-
tangible capital determines the level of the ﬁrm’s intrinsic value would be completely
missed.
To take another interesting example, MFP is normally thought of as a black box
but perhaps this box is full of what researchers mean by intangibles. Indeed, many of
the examples used to illustrate the role that intangibles play in organizations have the
ﬂavor of MFP. That is, intangible capital comes from a good idea like selling computers
over the Internet in Dell’s case; or, a unique corporate culture created by CEOs like Jack
Welch or Bill Gates. Be that as it may, most intangible assets appear to be created by
investment, as argued in the introduction. After all, Dell cannot sell computers over
the Internet without its own computers, and Microsoft spends more than $5 billion
annually on R&D and advertising.
In summary, by pursuing an estimation strategy like GMM with instruments that are
arguably orthogonal to the error term, one might recover something closer to the direct
impact of any asset on market value. However, one will by construction miss the role
of omitted intangibles or intangibles that underlie the productivity shock. Thus, such
IV strategies can be informative, but they cannot provide the full set of answers about
the role of intangibles.
In fact, Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2000, 2002) have taken this argument one step
further: They say that the eﬀect of intangible capital can be indirectly inferred from
19OLS estimates of the return to IT capital. Two points are worth making about this
argument, the ﬁrst methodological and the second empirical.
First, OLS cannot be used to separate out all the direct and indirect eﬀects of in-
tangible capital. In particular, the return to, or the stock of, intangible capital cannot
be inferred from the biased OLS coeﬃcient on IT capital. When intangible capital is
an omitted variable and IT capital is the only other type of capital, a straightforward
analysis of omitted variable bias reveals that the coeﬃcient on IT capital is
p limbKIT = βKIT + βKICβKIC,KIT,
where βKIC is the return to intangible capital and βKIC,KIT is the coeﬃcient estimate
from a hypothetical regression of the omitted intangible KIC on IT capital: βKIC,KIT =
COV(KIC,KIT)/VAR(KIT). For example, if $1 of IT capital is associated with more
than $1 of omitted intangible capital, βKIC,KIT > 1.
Using ﬁrm-level data, Brynjolfsson et al. estimate bKIT using OLS and ﬁnd that each
dollar of IT capital is associated with about ten dollars of market value. They interpret
this ﬁnding as revealing the existence of a “large stock of intangible assets that are com-
plementary with IT spending (emphasis added).” However, that conclusion depends on
assumptions about little understood relationships. Speciﬁcally, to say anything about
the value of intangible capital, one has to know the return to IT capital. And to say any-
thing about the return to intangibles or the size of the stock of intangibles, the value
of intangible capital must be broken into its constituent components. Brynjolfsson et
al. solve these problems by assuming that there are no adjustment costs, in which case
the returns to IT and intangible capital are equal to unity (βKIT = βKIC = 1), and the
stock of intangible capital associated with IT capital can be backed out. According to
20this argument, the stock market doesn’t literally value $1 of IT capital at $10. Rather,
the estimate is a “marker” for the existence of a large stock of IT-related intangibles.
The second concern is empirical: the results in Brynjolfsson et al. (2000) contradict
theirinterpretationoftheestimateonITcapital. Whentheauthorsaddedavariablethat
measures organizational intangibles, ORG, to the regressions, βKIT is almost totally
unaﬀected.11 If the additional variable better measures intangibles, as the authors
argue persuasively, then bKIT should have fallen signiﬁcantly because it’s a “marker”
for intangibles. Since the estimate was about unchanged, bKIT must be biased for
another reason, like the stock market mismeasurement or simultaneity bias that I’ve
highlighted. If that is the case, it is advisable to adopt an empirical technique that
corrects for the bias.
4 Data
4.1 Sources and deﬁnitions
The limiting factor in terms of the data is the availability of information about IT out-
lays. For IT expenditures I use a data set compiled by Lev and Radhakrishnan (this
volume) from Information Week, which is in turn based on surveys by the Gartner Group.
The total sample is an unbalanced panel of ﬁrms that appeared in the Information Week
500 list between 1991 and 1997 and for which Compustat and IBES data are available.
The variables used in the empirical analysis are deﬁned as follows:
11In their subsequent paper, Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) did not include the telling regression from their
ﬁrst paper. Instead, they interacted ORG with employment. Although the interpretation of the eﬀect of
ORG is complicated this interaction, the take away point remained the same: the estimate on IT capital
did not change signiﬁcantly when ORG interacted with employment was included in the regression.
21• VE is the sum of the market value of common equity (deﬁned as the number of
common shares outstanding multiplied by the end-of-ﬁscal-year common stock
price) and the market value of preferred stock (deﬁned as the ﬁrm’s preferred div-
idend payout divided by S&P’s preferred dividend yield obtained from Citibase).
•   V is the present value of analysts’ proﬁt forecasts. Let Πit and Πi,t+1 denote
ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁts in periods t and t + 1 formed using beginning-of-period
information. Letgit denoteﬁrmi’sexpectedgrowthrateofproﬁtsinthefollowing
periods formed using beginning-of-period information. Notice, the stock market
valuation of the ﬁrm, VE, is dated at time t − 1 so the market information set
contains these forecasts. Then I calculate the implied level of proﬁts for periods
after t + 1 by growing out the average of Πit and Πi,t+1 at the rate git. Let this
average be ¯ Πit.12
The resulting discounted sequence of proﬁts deﬁnes   Vit:
  Vit = Πit + βtΠi,t+1 + β2
t(1 + git)¯ Πit + β3
t(1 + git)2¯ Πit
+β4
t(1 + git)3¯ Πit + β5
t
(1 + git)3¯ Πit
¯ r − ¯ g
The constant discount factor reﬂects a static expectation of the nominal interest
rate over this ﬁve year horizon; that is I use the Treasury bill interest rate in year
12In principle, the horizon for calculating   V should be inﬁnity. However, the analysts estimate g over a
horizon of ﬁve years. Thus, in order to match the horizon for which there is information, I set the forecast
horizon to ﬁve years. A terminal value correction accounts for the ﬁrm’s value beyond year ﬁve. The
correction assumes that the growth rate for proﬁts beyond this ﬁve-year horizon is equal to that for the
economy. Speciﬁcally, the last year of expected earnings is turned into a growth perpetuity by dividing it
by (¯ r − ¯ g); where I assume that ¯ r is the mean nominal interest rate for the sample period as a whole (about
15%, which includes a constant 8 % risk premium) and ¯ g is the mean nominal growth rate of the economy
for the sample period as a whole (about 6%).
22t (plus a ﬁxed 8% risk premium as suggested by Brealey and Myers (2000) among
others).
• Dt is the book value of debt which is the sum of short- and long-term obligations.
• Ct is net current assets, essentially cash-on-hand.
• I and K are capital expenditures and the current-cost net stock of property, plant,
and equipment (both excluding IT). The current-cost stock is constructed with the
perpetual inventory method using an industry-level rate of economic depreciation
constructed from Hulten and Wykoﬀ (1981).
• IT and KIT are IT expenditures and the current-cost net stock of IT. IT outlays
are from the Information Week survey. The current-cost stock is constructed with
the perpetual inventory method using a depreciation rate consistent with annual
economic depreciation of 40%.
• IP and KIP are IP expenditures and the current-cost net stock of IP. IP expendi-
tures are the sum of R&D and advertising. The current-cost stock is constructed
with the perpetual inventory method using a depreciation rate consistent with
annual economic depreciation of 25%.
Thesampleusedforestimationincludesallﬁrmswithatleastfourconsecutiveyears
of complete data. Four years of data are required to allow for ﬁrst-diﬀerencing and the
use of lagged variables as instruments. The determination whether the ﬁrm satisﬁes
the four-year requirement is done after deleting several observations that looked like
recording or reporting errors. Also, a few observations were deleted because   V<0.13
13The data and programs for this study are available at www.insitesgroup.com/jason.
23Table 1 describes details about the sample. The ﬁrst two rows deﬁne the diﬀerent
proxies for the intrinsic value of the ﬁrm. The total value of the ﬁrm consists of three
components: the return to equity holders, VE or   V, the return to debt holders, D, and
an adjustment for net current assets, C. At both the mean and median values, the
stock-market-based value is about three-quarters greater than the analyst-based value.
Another notable feature of the sample is that spending on IT and IP is a large fraction
of total investment spending at the mean and median values.
4.2 A Look at Analysts’ Forecasts
To lay the foundation for using the analyst-based proxy for the intrinsic value of the
ﬁrm, I compare the analysts’ forecasts of long-term growth, git, with realizations of
growth over a three-year horizon. As a ﬁrst pass, the analysts expected proﬁts to grow
at an annual rate of 11.3% for the mean ﬁrm in my sample. Over a three-year horizon,
proﬁts actually grew at just a touch slower rate of 11%.
Figure 1 presents a more detailed comparison of actual and expected proﬁt growth
with each dot representing a single ﬁrm-year observation. Three features of the data
are apparent. First, analysts don’t forecast negative long-term growth. That’s sensible,
since such forecasts would be equivalent to saying that the company is essentially
worthless. Second, analysts are loath to forecast very high long-term growth rates.
That’s sensible too. Very few companies generate proﬁt growth in excess of 30%, and
it’s hard to identify ex ante those that may. Finally, actual proﬁt growth is highly
variable. Some companies do grow at very fast rates or suﬀer large retrenchments.
The OLS regression line describes the average relationship between the two vari-
ables. Actual and expected earnings growth are positively related — the slope of the
24regression line is 0.74 with a standard error of 0.15 — but realized earnings growth
often diﬀers widely from analysts’ expectations.14 Moreover, the forecasts tend to be
overly optimistic on average. In addition, analysts do not issue particularly accurate
long-range forecasts; evidently, a lot can happen to a company over a three year period,
most of which cannot be anticipated. However, the key requirement for my purpose
is not forecast accuracy, but rather the ability of analysts’ forecasts to capture the
expected future returns on which the ﬁrm’s investment decisions are based. Judged
according to this metric, analysts’ forecasts appear to be reasonable and informative
assessments about companies’ future prospects.
5 Empirical Results
The empirical results are laid out in two stages. In Table 2, I present OLS estimates of the
empirical valuation equations in levels and within groups. After establishing that these
results are consistent with the sort of bias I’ve described, I present in Table 3 the results
from two GMM estimators. First, I present a standard estimator that ﬁrst-diﬀerences
the empirical equations and uses lagged capital stocks as instrumental variables. For
reasons described in section 3.2, the coeﬃcient estimates are likely to be downward-
biased in this case. Second, I present results from the system-GMM estimator. The
diagnostic statistics indicate that system-GMM is well-behaved when using the analyst-
based measure of intrinsic value and the results themselves are quite sensible.
14A few extreme observations have been left out of the ﬁgure in order to maintain a 1:1 aspect ratio.
These observations are, however, included in ﬁtting the regression.
255.1 OLS results
In the speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst column of Table 2, the coeﬃcient on IT capital substan-
tially and signiﬁcantly exceeds unity as does the coeﬃcient on IP capital. Meanwhile,
the estimate of the return to tangible capital is signiﬁcantly less than unity.15 According
to this ﬁrst pass at the data, $1 of IT capital is associated with about $2 of unmeasured
intangibles and $1 of IP capital is associated with about $1 of unmeasured intangibles.
Thus my basic results parallel those reported by Brynjolfsson et al. despite the fact
that I don’t use the same ﬁrms or estimation period; I use diﬀerent techniques for
constructing the capital stocks; and I use diﬀerent regressors.16
The basic pattern of estimates in column 1 is similar to the pattern in column 2,
where   V replaces VE. In particular, using an analyst-based or a market-based deﬁnition
of intrinsic value doesn’t make much of a diﬀerence when estimating in levels using
OLS. However, the estimates on IT capital are considerably smaller in columns 3 and
4, where net current assets are accounted for in valuing the ﬁrm. Apparently, large IT
capital stocks are associated with relatively abundant net current assets — an example
is Microsoft, which has a large stock of IT and has built up a huge cash cushion on
its balance sheet. When this relationship is ignored, the coeﬃcient on IT capital picks
up both the eﬀect of intangibles and the omitted eﬀect of net current assets. Thus, to
develop an accurate picture about the role of IT capital, the value of the ﬁrm has to be
deﬁned carefully.
15Recall from the theoretical model that the beginning of period capital stocks belong on the right hand
side of the empirical valuation equation. According to equation (2) the beginning-of-period capital stocks
are equal to the diﬀerence between the current capital stock and current investment. Hence, the relevant
regressors are (Kt − It) and so on.
16It was not possible to investigate the eﬀects of these diﬀerences because Brynjolfsson et al. declined
to share their data.
26The results presented so far do not control for unobserved heterogeneity. As a re-
sult, the estimates are diﬃcult to interpret because the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀect is surely
correlated with contemporaneous capital investments. To sweep out the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
eﬀect, the within-groups estimates presented in columns 5 and 6 express all of the
variables as deviations from within-ﬁrm means. In this case, the coeﬃcients on IT are
signiﬁcantly negative in both speciﬁcations, and the coeﬃcients on the other types of
capital appear downward biased in the ﬁnal column. These ﬁndings are not unexpected
because the capital stocks are highly persistent. While unit root tests are useless for
short panels, the (unreported) AR(1) coeﬃcient estimates from regressions of the cur-
rent capital stocks on their ﬁrst lags are all greater than 0.92. In such situations, the
received wisdom from the literature on production function estimation indicates that
one should expect downward bias from within-groups estimates.17
5.2 GMM results
The GMM estimates are motivated by the observation that the within-groups results
do nothing to control for simultaneity bias. Such bias must be important because the
value of the ﬁrm (no matter how it is measured) and its investment policy are jointly
determined. To see the intuition behind this point, compare the empirical valuation
equation to an empirical investment equation based on Tobin’s Q. In the current setup,
the ﬁrm’s intrinsic value is a function of the capital stock and investment, whereas the
reverse is true in an equation that relates the investment rate to Tobin’s Q. Put simply,
increases in market value may cause investment in IT (and other types of capital), not
17In fact, it is not unusual for production function estimates of the capital share to go from 0.3 in levels
to negative values for within-groups. The magnitude of the bias in Table 2 may seem surprisingly large by
comparison, but keep in mind that production functions are estimated in logs.
27the reverse. To deal with simultaneity bias (and eliminate the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀect at the
same time), the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced empirical valuation equations are estimated with GMM,
using lagged levels of the capital stocks as instruments. These results are reported in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.
Taking a look ﬁrst at the Sargan test, the p-values in columns 1 and 2 do not indicate
a decisive rejection of the model’s overidentifying restrictions. That doesn’t mean,
however, that the instruments are informative. Indeed, in unreported results, I conﬁrm
that weak instruments cannot be rejected using the partial R2 or ﬁrst-stage F-statistic
as criteria. If the instruments used in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equations are weak, then the
results should be biased in the direction of within-groups.18 Indeed, a comparison of
columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 to columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 shows that the direction and
magnitude of the bias are similar in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced and within-groups estimates.
To address concerns about weak instruments, I use the system-GMM estimator in
columns 3 and 4. Again, begin by looking at the Sargan test, which indicates that the
model using VE is decisively rejected while the one using   V is not. This suggests that the
instruments are correlated with the market’s mismeasurement of companies’ intrinsic
values but not with the analysts’ mismeasurement of the same. Why might that be? As
I have argued, intangibles are diﬃcult to value. If, say, the lagged change in the stock
of intangibles is correlated with the extent to which the market overstates the ﬁrm’s
intrinsic value, then the system-GMM estimator will tend to be rejected. By contrast,
for reasons I’ve detailed, there’s less reason to worry that analysts’ forecast errors are
correlated with the lagged change in the stock of intangibles, and this conjecture is
18The technical explanation for this statement depends on two things. First, weak instruments will bias
2SLS in the direction of OLS. Second, the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator coincides with a 2SLS estimator
when the ﬁxed eﬀects are removed with the orthogonal deviations transformation; and, OLS transformed to
orthogonal deviations coincides with within groups. Therefore, weak instruments will bias this particular
2SLS estimator (which coincides with ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM) in the direction of within groups.
28born out by the Sargan test. Therefore, my preferred estimates use the analyst-based
measure of the ﬁrm’s intrinsic value.
In column 4, the coeﬃcient estimates on tangible and IP capital are insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from unity (although they are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero), and the coeﬃ-
cient on IT capital is signiﬁcantly greater than unity. Taken at face value, the coeﬃcient
on IT capital implies that organizational capital earns a 70% annual rate of return, a
ﬁgure that might seem excessive. However, two points are worth nothing. First, the
evidence of excess returns is statistically weak because the 95% conﬁdence interval en-
compasses returns as low as 7%. Second, in my model the return to IT capital includes
the eﬀect of adjustment costs; indeed, that is how organizational capital is deﬁned
in equation (6). This possibility is seldom noted because researchers usually estimate
the return to IT using a static production function, which assumes that capital is in a
steady-state equilibrium so that adjustment costs are zero by construction.19
The coeﬃcient on IP capital is less than unity, a result consistent with earlier ﬁnd-
ings that R&D earns a somewhat less than normal rate of return (see, e.g., Hall 1993b).
Perhaps ﬁrms cannot reap the full beneﬁt of their IP investments owing to the nonex-
clusive nature of some types of R&D (see, e.g., Griliches 1979; Jaﬀe 1986; Bernstein
and Nadiri 1989). However, caution is warranted in drawing such a conclusion because
the 95% conﬁdence interval encompasses returns as large as 20%, more in line with the
recent ﬁndings in Hand (2002). Finally, the estimate on tangible capital (excluding IT) is
slightly less than unity. This is consistent with lower rates of return on these types of
19To elaborate on the implications of my approach in the context of a production function, notice that
the marginal product of capital in my model is equal to the traditional user cost plus adjustment costs. For
example, abstracting from taxes and setting the price of capital equal to unity, the equilibrium condition
in my model is
∂Π
∂KIT = r + δKIT +
∂C
∂KIT . So long as adjustment costs are positive, the estimated return
to capital can exceed (r + δKIT), the usual equilibrium required rate of return in the production function
framework.
29capital and with recent studies in which estimated adjustment costs are quite modest
in size (see, e.g., Bond and Cummins 2002).
6 Conclusion
The dramatic rise of the stock market in the 1990s led some observers to conclude that
intangible capital was an increasingly important contributor to the bottom line at many
companies. However, the abrupt and sustained decline in the stock market that began
in 2000 seemed to suggest just the opposite. This reversal highlights the desirability
of alternative measurement strategies that would distinguish between the gyrations of
the stock market and the value created by intangibles.
My empirical approach oﬀers such an alternative strategy, with both a diﬀerent
perspective about what intangibles are and how researchers can estimate their return.
In my model, intangible capital is not a distinct input to production like physical capital
or labor; indeed, I assume that intangibles cannot be purchased in a market like a
computer or a college graduate. Nor are intangibles some kind of relabeled MFP. Rather
intangible capital is the glue that creates value from the usual factor inputs. This
perspective naturally leads to an empirical model in which intangible capital is deﬁned
in terms of adjustment costs. As such, intangibles are the diﬀerence between the value
of installed and uninstalled inputs.
In my empirical approach, I use two proxies for the intrinsic value of the ﬁrm, one
based on the ﬁrm’s stock market value and the other based on analysts’ proﬁt forecast.
In addition, I use a GMM estimation technique to control for unobserved heterogene-
ity and simultaneity bias in speciﬁcations with nearly-integrated regressors. Using
the analyst-based proxy and the GMM technique, there is no evidence of economically
30important intangibles associated with investment in intellectual property or physical
capital apart from IT. However, my estimates suggest that organizational capital cre-
ated by information technology generates a 70% annual rate of return.
These ﬁndings come with a caveat attached. Controlling for simultaneity bias and
unobserved heterogeneity removes intangibles that may have been swept into the er-
ror term, either as omitted variables or as part of the unobservable productivity shock.
Nevertheless, alternative empirical approaches are unpalatable to say the least. Indeed,
my OLS estimates would seem to imply a strong role for intangibles but they are un-
reliable because the value of the ﬁrm and its investment policy are jointly determined.
In the end, how best to characterize the heterogeneity across ﬁrms and the role that
intangibles play remains an open question. Are intangibles a part of the unobservable
productivity shock? Are intangibles some ﬁxed (or quasi-ﬁxed) factor that interact in
complex ways with other inputs? The answers to these questions remain unresolved.
Finally, it’s worth reﬂecting on whether my approach suggests ways to incorporate
intangible capital in national income accounting. At a very basic level, the implications
are not encouraging. Factor inputs in the national accounts have prices, albeit ones
that are often diﬃcult to measure accurately. By contrast, my approach starts with the
assumption that intangibles are nearly impossible to value on a standalone basis. In
particular, intangibles have unobservable shadow prices that depend on expectations.
This setup makes the return to intangibles impossible to measure directly and uncertain
by construction. These two features make intangible capital particularly ill-suited to
national income accounting. Nevertheless, my approach does suggest a road map for
improving the national accounts. A key ingredient for better understanding the scope
of intangibles is detailed data on the types of outlays that are closely connected with
31intangibles. In this regard, the national accounts could be considerably improved. I
focused on IT, R&D, and advertising but it would be desirable to have data on other
types of outlays as well, such as education, on-the-job training programs and the like.
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= 2.94 + 0.74*
(1.80)  (0.15)
AGR EGR it itTable 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Empirical Analysis
(Millions of Current-Dollars)
standard ﬁrst third
Variable mean deviation quartile median quartile
(VE + D − C) 12,315 23,225 2,321 5,086 12,402
(  V + D − C) 7,208 15,308 1,179 2,942 7,379
K 5,822 10,107 734 2,051 6,453
KIT 922 2,013 135 337 802
KIP 1,726 4,289 0 292 1,304
I 769 1,696 107 298 729
IT 223 461 35.0 81.1 200
IP 383 997 0 53.0 255
The sample contains ﬁrms with at least four years of complete data. The number of ﬁrms in
this sample is 253, for a total of 1,503 observations, and the sample period is 1991–1997.Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Valuation Equations
Levels Within-Groups
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
(VE
t + Dt)(   Vt + Dt)( V E
t + Dt − Ct)(   Vt + Dt − Ct)( V E
t + Dt − Ct)(   Vt + Dt − Ct)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Kt − It) 0.753 0.482 0.821 0.550 0.892 0.182
(0.075) (0.064) (0.064) (0.048) (0.216) (0.169)
(KITt − ITt) 3.19 3.14 1.97 1.91 -6.67 -8.63
(0.491) (0.416) (0.415) (0.316) (0.836) (0.656)
(KIPt − IPt) 2.07 1.54 1.84 1.31 2.67 0.383
(0.211) (0.179) (0.179) (0.136) (0.685) (0.537)
Diagnostic Tests (p-values)
First-Order
Serial Correlation 0.070 0.066 0.143 0.169 0.930 0.886
Second-Order
Serial Correlation 0.086 0.086 0.171 0.214 0.245 0.317
¯ R2 0.451 0.401 0.474 0.457 0.107 0.171
Year dummies are included (but not reported) in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors on coeﬃcients are in
parentheses.
The sample contains ﬁrms with at least four years of complete data. The number of ﬁrms in this sample is 253,
for a total of 1250 observations, and the estimation period is 1992–1997.
The tests for serial correlation in the residuals is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial
correlation.Table 3: GMM Estimates of the Valuation Equations
First-Differences System
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
(VE
t + Dt − Ct)(   Vt + Dt − Ct)( V E
t + Dt − Ct)(   Vt + Dt − Ct)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Kt − It) 0.399 0.007 1.75 0.846
(0.478) (0.197) (0.144) (0.135)
(KITt − ITt) -12.9 -11.3 0.725 1.72
(1.33) (1.30) (0.390) (0.327)
(KIPt − IPt) 9.72 3.93 0.652 0.684
(1.80) (1.01) (0.273) (0.257)
Diagnostic Tests (p-values)
First-Order
Serial Correlation 0.656 0.634 0.883 0.644
Second-Order
Serial Correlation 0.345 0.488 0.326 0.463
Sargan Test 0.047 0.360 0.000 0.073
Year dummies are included (but not reported) in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors on
coeﬃcients are in parentheses.
The sample contains ﬁrms with at least four years of complete data. The number of ﬁrms in
this sample is 253, for a total of 1250 observations, and the estimation period is 1992–1997.
In the ﬁrst-diﬀerences estimator, the instrumental variables are the levels of the period
t − 3 and t − 4 capital stocks. In the system estimator, the valuation equation in ﬁrst-
diﬀerences is estimated jointly with the valuation equation in levels. The instrumental
variables for the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equation are the levels of the period t − 3 and t − 4 capital
stocks. The instrumental variables for levels equation are the ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the period
t−2 capital stocks. Year dummy variables are also included as instruments in all speciﬁcations.
The tests for serial correlation in the residuals is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the
null of no serial correlation. The test of the overidentifying restrictions, called a Sargan test, is
asymptotically distributed as χ2
(n−p), where n is the number of instruments and p is the number
of parameters.